Zoom link: https://princeton.zoom.us/my/monamon?pwd=UDhNd3RQVmlISGZXeDhBSCsyVU9iUT09

Censorship and surveillance events continue to increase at an unprecedented scale, enabled by the proliferation of censorship-capable network devices that can quickly inspect and interfere with large amounts of network traffic. Advancements in networking device technology and the commoditization of deep packet inspection (DPI) devices for the purpose of enterprise network monitoring have made this censorship capability available to a growing number of countries, including those with poor human rights records. While these censorship technologies have proliferated, techniques to identify and monitor them are still relatively limited. In particular, many of these techniques focus on what is blocked, and discovering how the blocking occurs, but there are very few large-scale surveys on the censorship network devices themselves, and their vendors. This work aims to develop techniques to identify and monitor the deployment of devices that perform network censorship at Internet-scale. We perform large-scale probing of network censorship-capable middleboxes to develop accurate network-level fingerprints of censorship middleboxes, and discover how many network devices on the Internet are built on devices capable of network censorship.

Everyone is invited to attend the talk, and those faculty wishing to remain for the oral exam following are welcome to do so.