Should we secure routing with the RPKI
Sharon Goldberg, Boston University
Thursday, September 19, 4:30-5:30pm
Computer Science, 402


In this talk I will overview the benefits and risks of adopting the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a new centralized security infrastructure for interdomain routing that has recently been standardized by the IETF. On one hand, I argue that the RPKI is one of the most effective ways to limit attacks on interdomain routing; more so, in fact, than more advanced cryptographic solutions that require more drastic changes to router hardware and protocol messages. On the other hand, I discuss how state-sponsored actors and malicious attackers can exploit the RPKI's centralized architecture to launch new attacks that can cause serious harm to the Internet's routing system. I conclude by discussing open problems that should be solved before the RPKI is widely adopted.

Based on works with Robert Lychev, Pete Hummon, Jennifer Rexford, and Michael Schapira that appeared at SIGCOMM'10 and SIGCOMM'13, and work in progress with Kyle Brogle, Danny Cooper, Ethan Heilman, and Leonid Reyzin.

Sharon Goldberg is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Boston University. Her research focuses on finding practical solutions to problems in network security. She received her Ph.D. from Princeton University in 2009, her B.A.Sc. from the University of Toronto in 2003, and has worked as a researcher at IBM, Cisco, and Microsoft, and a telecommunication engineer at Bell Canada and Hydro One Networks.